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U.S Congresswoman Jackson Lee has a sharp insight into US interests in the South Asian region and is a vocal admirer of Pakistan’s role in fighting terrorism, yet even she failed to anticipate the negative impact some contentious and ambiguous wording in the Kerry Lugar Bill (KLB) would have.
 
Before one turns to that specific wording, it would be worthwhile to revisit why the US Congress passed this legislation entitled “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.” Well, the USA established that it shared some important strategic interests with Pakistan and that Pakistan had the wherewithal to further both its own strategic interests and also those of the USA. The Pakistan-USA cooperation against terrorists over the previous decade had established the willingness and ability of both sides to work together. The USA acknowledged that the terrorist problem was the result of mismanaging the aftermath of the Afghan-Soviet conflict for which a number of countries, including the USA, shared responsibility.  Finally, given how the war against terrorists had ravaged its economy, Pakistan required funding.
 
KLB sought to deepen the strategic engagement of the two countries by funding strategic initiatives and winning “hearts and minds.” Given this background, one would have expected that KLB would stick to some principles: a) focus on the strategic alignment of USA and Pakistan rather than on secondary “issues” in the relationship, b) identify the strategic “thrust areas” to which funding would be targeted, c) Given incidence of political and other corruption, suggest mechanisms to ensure transparency in use of funds, d) other than these areas, treat Pakistan like a “black box” thereby respecting its sovereignty.
 
But the following italicized parts of Section 203 (c) of the bill violate these principles (italics added):
 
“(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that:
 
“(1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
 
“(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and

(3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.”
 
The Pakistani legislature and other segments of society can surely be expected to take umbrage, as they are, at this unnecessarily detailed (particularly when only “such as” examples are being provided), rather meddlesome wording that is so pregnant with unfair insinuation.
The following changes will ensure that the Bill conforms to its stated objectives within reason:
 
Current

• or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks; - 203 (c) (1)

New

• Dlete the phrase – it is being quoted as an example in any case rather than a requirement for annual ratification

 
Current

• (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; - 203 (c) (2)

New

• This phraseology takes insinuation and innuendo – which exist about all intelligence agencies be they CIA, RAW, Mossad or ISI – into the unfamiliar and unlikely environment of legislation. Bad move. The intent should be described fairly and generically as follows: “Continuing to work toward interdicting and dismantling terrorist networks;”

 
Current

• including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; - 203 (c) (2)

New

• Are you kidding? This sounds like an operational assessment rather than legislation. Given the not-too-impressive achievements of USA intelligence in countries like Iraq, how sure of we of all this anyway? Surely, if at all needed, all this can be worked out later between players who actually care about this level of detail. Delete the phrase, Chuck it out!

 
 
Current

• the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan - 203 (c) (3)

New

• The intention is laudable particularly with the US history of supporting friendly military regimes worldwide, but this language is a bad idea for several reasons: It is unacceptably intrusive into Pakistani affairs and vitiates claims by the bill’s authors and supporters in the US Congress to the affect that the bill does not impinge on Pakistan’s sovereignty, it alienates the institution that is most critical to USA interests i.e. the Pakistan Army, and it will be hard, if not impossible, to verify – short of a declaration of Martial Law.  The language should be replaced by the following: “continuation of a democratic form of Government in the country.”

 
The Kerry Luger Bill, if passed in its current form, will rile Pakistani masses and alienate key stakeholders like the Pakistan Army – apologists like President Zardari and Ambassador Haqqani notwithstanding. This will shortchange fundamentals goals of the bill from the USA perspective i.e. developing a strategic partnership with Pakistan and winning “hearts and minds.” If the USA Congress is still this wary of Pakistan’s “worthiness” as a partner, then it needs to revisit basic assumptions and motivations of the bill – and scrap the bill altogether if need be. Either way, unless it reforms the bills language as suggested above, it will be hurting its own vital interest.